But I Like Doing This! Enjoyable Tasks, Contracting, and Automation

Joshua S. Gans · NBER Working Papers · June 2026

Where this sits in the debate

Will AI destroy more jobs than it creates?

Direction of the finding as read from the abstract by an AI model (AI-written).

Key takeaway AI-written

Gans builds a contracting model of "O-ring" jobs where workers intrinsically enjoy certain tasks and voluntarily contribute unpaid hours, comparing complete task-bundle pricing against paid task floors that let workers top up their own time. The framework shows how automation interacts with task enjoyment in determining which contract form minimizes the wage bill and which tasks firms should automate. It matters for the AI debate because it formalizes a neglected margin: when AI automates tasks workers actually like, firms lose a source of free effort, so the labor-market effects of automation depend on task-level preferences, not just marginal products.

The paper in three steps AI-written

Written by an AI agent from the paper's abstract, which is the primary source and is quoted below.

The question

How do contracts and automation choices change when workers enjoy some of their tasks and give them unpaid time?

The approach

A theoretical model of O-ring jobs in which firms either price a complete task bundle or set paid task floors while workers may add time voluntarily.

The findings

The abstract shows the model compares the wage bill under the two hourly contract types; the full results are not given in the emitted abstract.

How to read it: theory. A theoretical model — its value is the mechanism it isolates; ask whether the assumptions fit the real economy.

Limitations and counterpoints AI-written

The emitted abstract is cut short, so the paper's conclusions about automation cannot be summarised from it; the work is theoretical.

Abstract

Workers sometimes enjoy productive tasks and voluntarily devote unpaid time to them. We study O-ring jobs in which firms can either price a complete task bundle or specify paid task floors while workers remain free to add time. For any allocation supported by both hourly contracts, the wage bill is

About this publication

Working paper. A working paper — circulated for discussion before formal peer review, the standard first outlet in economics.

Published: 2026
Citations: Not recorded for this source

Citation counts come from OpenAlex; none are recorded for this source — absence of a count is not absence of citations.