Liability and Pricing of Dual-Use AI
Joshua S. Gans · NBER Working Papers · September 2026
Where this sits in the debate
Direction of the finding as read from the abstract by an AI model (AI-written).
Abstract
How much liability should AI providers bear when their services enable both attack and defence? Liability can improve welfare while increasing harm. Providers sell a common input to productive users, attackers and defenders. Within a defended contest, a higher common price reduces effort without
About this publication
Working paper. A working paper — circulated for discussion before formal peer review, the standard first outlet in economics.
- Published
- 2026
- Citations
- Not recorded for this source
Citation counts come from OpenAlex; none are recorded for this source — absence of a count is not absence of citations.
Joshua Gans signed the wemustactnow.ai letter — part of why this paper is in the collection.
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