Will AI destroy more jobs than it creates?
The numbers
What the published studies estimate on “Will AI destroy more jobs than it creates?”
18 numbers from 15 published papers, each taken from the source’s own words (its abstract, or a verbatim passage of a curated source) with the sentence it comes from. Hover or tap a point for the quote; every point links to its paper.
Forecasts of jobs at risk from AI
Each point is one estimate of the share of jobs at high risk of automation or expected to be lost, by the date it was published; bars show the author’s own range. 8 estimates from 7 sources, grouped like the growth forecasts: economists and AI insiders. Definitions differ (high risk of automation, displaced by a date, a slice of jobs such as entry-level white-collar work), and none of them is a net count: most also expect new jobs. Read the spread, not a single number.
EconomistsAI insidersShaded: the middle half of each group
Shares
Shares of jobs, tasks, workers or firms, as reported. Definitions differ between studies.
Open marker: AI labs’ own research
Other effects
Changes in employment, wages, adoption and other measures, as reported.
Open marker: AI labs’ own research
Read the source numbers
Each row retains its own definition, population and horizon. Rows are not a pooled estimate; a shared percentage unit does not make them comparable.
| Source | What it measures | Reported value | Source quotation |
|---|---|---|---|
| The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation? | US jobs at high risk of computerisation US | 47% | According to our estimate, 47 percent of total US employment is in the high-risk category |
| The Delegation Divide: An Open Index of AI-Agent Delegability across Occupations and Countries | Share of jobs or tasks exposed to AI Region and horizon not recorded | 35.2% | 35.2% of task time in world employment is at least partly delegable to AI agents in 2026, and only 2.5% can be handed over in full. |
| GPTs are GPTs: An Early Look at the Labor Market Impact Potential of Large Language Models | Workers with at least 10% of tasks affected by LLMs US | 80% | around 80% of the U.S. workforce could have at least 10% of their work tasks affected by the introduction of LLMs |
| GPTs are GPTs: An Early Look at the Labor Market Impact Potential of Large Language Models | Workers with at least 50% of tasks affected by LLMs US | 19% | approximately 19% of workers may see at least 50% of their tasks impacted |
| The Last Generation to Learn a Trade: How Artificial Intelligence Is Reshaping the Labor Market at a Speed History Has Never Seen, and Why the Transition Will Spare Almost Nobody | Jobs facing meaningful disruption from AI (synthesis of other estimates) advanced economies | 50% (range 40 to 60) | between 40 and 60 percent of jobs in advanced economies face meaningful disruption from AI |
| Can we predict the jobs robots will do? | Working hours in physical tasks present-day robots can perform US | 34% | robots can already perform 74% of physical tasks in the US, making up 34% of working hours |
| Can we predict the jobs robots will do? | Work for which robots are cost-competitive with people US | 0.3% | are cost-competitive with people for just 0.3% of work |
| The Risk of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries | Jobs at high risk of automation, average of 21 OECD countries 21 OECD countries | 9% | Overall, we find that, on average across the 21 OECD countries, 9 % of jobs are automatable. |
| Automation, skills use and training | Jobs highly automatable (over 70% probability), OECD countries in PIAAC OECD (PIAAC countries) | 14% | About 14% of jobs in OECD countries participating in PIAAC are highly automatable |
| Jobs lost, jobs gained: Workforce transitions in a time of automation | Global workforce that could be displaced by automation, 2016-2030 World · 2016-2030 | 15% | around 15 percent of the global workforce, or about 400 million workers, could be displaced by automation in the period 2016–2030 |
| How Will AI Affect the Global Workforce? | US workforce displaced if AI is widely adopted US | 6.5% (range 6 to 7) | could displace 6-7% of the US workforce if AI is widely adopted |
| The Future of Jobs Report 2025 | Current jobs displaced by 2030 (all trends, not only AI; net growth 7%) World · 2025-2030 | 8% | the displacement of the equivalent of 8% (or 92 million) of current jobs |
| Behind the Curtain: A white-collar bloodbath | Entry-level white-collar jobs AI could wipe out US · 1-5 years | 50% | AI could wipe out half of all entry-level white-collar jobs |
| Behind the Curtain: A white-collar bloodbath | Unemployment rate AI could cause US · 1-5 years | 15% (range 10 to 20) | spike unemployment to 10-20% in the next one to five years |
| Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence | Employment of early-career workers (22-25) in the most AI-exposed jobs, relative US | −13% | early-career workers (ages 22-25) in the most AI-exposed occupations have experienced a 13 percent relative decline in employment |
| Large Language Models, Small Labor Market Effects | Effect of AI chatbots on earnings and hours (a precise zero) Denmark | 0% (range −1 to 1) | AI chatbots have had no significant impact on earnings or recorded hours in any occupation, with confidence intervals ruling out effects larger than 1% |
| Tracking AI’s Real-Time Footprint On The Labor Market | Employment in AI-exposed jobs (software development, customer service) this year US · 2026 | −4% | Employment in AI-exposed jobs like software development and customer service has dropped by more than 4% this year |
| The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Israel’s Labor Market | Israeli workforce with high AI exposure and low complementarity (vulnerable to displacement) Israel | 20% | about one-fifth of the workforce faces high exposure with low complementarity, indicating their vulnerability to displacement |