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How fast will the impact arrive?

The numbers

What the published studies estimate on “How fast will the impact arrive?”

17 numbers from 13 published papers, each taken from the source’s own words (its abstract, or a verbatim passage of a curated source) with the sentence it comes from. Hover or tap a point for the quote; every point links to its paper.

When AI could match humans at every task

Each point is one forecast of the year by which AI could match or outperform humans at all tasks, by the date it was published; bars show a stated range. 6 forecasts from 6 sources: surveys of AI researchers (their aggregate 50% year) and the leaders of AI companies. Definitions differ (high-level machine intelligence, AGI, “powerful AI”), and a forecast is not a finding. The dashed line marks the year each forecast was made.

AI insiders: 2026–2030AI researchers: 2047–206120102020203020402050206020702017201820192020202120222023202420252026forecast yearAI researcher survey 2016 (AI researchers): 2061. AI researchers' 50% year for AI outperforming humans at all tasks (2016 survey). “when the aggregate prediction put 50% probability at 2061, i.e. 45 years out”AI researcher survey 2016AI researcher survey 2022 (AI researchers): 2059. AI researchers' 50% year for high-level machine intelligence (2022 survey). “The aggregate forecast time to a 50% chance of HLMI was 37 years, i.e. 2059”AI researcher survey 2022AI researcher survey 2023 (AI researchers): 2047. AI researchers' 50% year for machines outperforming humans at every task (2023 survey). “the chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task was estimated at 10% by 2027, and 50% by 2047”AI researcher survey 2023Amodei (Anthropic) (AI insider): 2026. Earliest year “powerful AI” could arrive. “I think it could come as early as 2026, though there are also ways it could take much longer.”Amodei (Anthropic)AI 2027 (AI insider): 2027. Modal (most likely) year for AGI at publication; medians were later. “2027 was our modal (most likely) year at the time of publication”AI 2027Hassabis 2025 (AI insider): 2030. Year AGI could arrive (“possibly the lower end” of five to 10 years). “maybe in the next five to 10 years, possibly the lower end of that” Implied: interview of August 2025 plus five to 10 years = 2030-2035; central value at the lower endHassabis 2025

AI insidersAI researchersShaded: the middle half of each groupDashed: the year the forecast was made

Forecasts of AI’s effect on growth

Each point is one estimate of extra growth a year from AI, by the date it was published; bars show the author’s own range. 35 estimates from 32 sources, grouped as in Tom Cunningham’s Forecasts of AI & Economic Growth: economists and AI insiders. Measures (GDP, TFP, labour productivity), regions and horizons differ, and a few are converted from a level or a survey (the tooltip says how), so read the spread, not a single number. Log scale.

Economists: 0.29–0.85AI insiders: 4–200.010.030.10.313103010020172018201920202021202220232024202520262027pp a yearPwC (economist): +1 pp a year. Extra annual global GDP growth, implied by the 2030 level gain. “Global GDP will be up to 14% higher in 2030 as a result of the accelerating development and take-up of AI” Implied: 14% higher level in 2030, spread over the 13 years from 2017: 1.14^(1/13) - 1 = 1.0 pp a yearPwCBriggs & Kodnani (economist): +1.5 pp a year. Extra annual labour productivity growth. “~+1.5pp/yr US labor productivity”Briggs & KodnaniChui (economist): +0.35 pp a year (range 0.1 to 0.6). Extra annual productivity growth potential. “~+0.1-0.6pp/yr productivity growth potential”ChuiBaily et al. (economist): +2.7 pp a year. Extra annual growth in the Level+Growth scenario: the 18% level gain as a yearly rate plus 1 pp. “additionally includes a one percentage point boost in the rate of growth over the baseline rate” Implied: 18% higher level over ten years = 1.18^(1/10) - 1 = 1.7 pp a year, plus the one percentage point growth boostBaily et al.Cowen (economist): +0.38 pp a year (range 0.25 to 0.5). Extra annual US growth (best guess). “will boost the annual US growth rate by one-quarter to one-half of a percentage point” Implied: 'one-quarter to one-half' is written in words; value is the midpointCowenBergeaud (economist): +0.29 pp a year. Extra annual TFP growth. “equivalent to an additional 0.29 percentage points per year”BergeaudKorinek & Suh (economist): +18 pp a year. Steady-state output growth in the baseline AGI scenario (a total rate). “the economy remains in region 2 where labor and capital are perfectly substitutable, with steady-state growth of 18% per year”Korinek & SuhAldasoro et al. (economist): +2.7 pp a year. Extra annual GDP growth, implied by the 10-year level gain. “at which point GDP is almost 30% higher than it would have been without” Implied: GDP almost 30% higher after 10 years: 1.30^(1/10) - 1 = 2.7 pp a yearAschenbrenner (AI insider): +30 pp a year. Extra annual GDP growth from AI. “We could see economic growth rates of 30%/year and beyond, quite possibly multiple doublings a year.”AschenbrennerAghion & Bunel (economist): +1.05 pp a year (range 0.8 to 1.3). Extra annual aggregate productivity growth (past-revolutions approach). “the AI revolution should increase aggregate productivity growth by between 0.8 and 1.3pp per year over the next decade”Aghion & Bunel (economist): +0.68 pp a year. Extra annual TFP growth, median (task-based approach). “we obtain a median estimate of 0.68pp additional annual total factor productivity (TFP) growth”Tytell (economist): +0.25 pp a year (range 0.2 to 0.3). Extra annual productivity growth over the next decade. “a productivity boost of 0.2%– 0.3% is plausible over the next decade”Acemoğlu (economist): +0.066 pp a year (range 0.053 to 0.066). Extra annual TFP growth. “no more than a 0.66% increase in total factor productivity (TFP) over 10 years” Implied: 0.53-0.66% over 10 years divided by 10AcemoğluAmodei (Anthropic) (AI insider): +20 pp a year. Annual GDP growth in the developing world, a 'dream scenario' (a total rate). “would be 20% annual GDP growth rate in the developing world”Amodei (Anthropic)Filippucci et al. (economist): +0.65 pp a year (range 0.4 to 0.9). Extra annual labour productivity growth. “(0.4-0.9 pp. for labour productivity)”Filippucci et al.Filippucci et al. (economist): +0.42 pp a year (range 0.25 to 0.6). Extra annual TFP growth. “annual aggregate total-factor productivity growth due to AI range between 0.25-0.6 percentage points”Wiseman & McClements (AI insider): +6 pp a year (range 3 to 9). Extra annual economic growth from AI. “We expect AI will provide a 3%-9% increase to economic growth per year in the near future”Wiseman & McClementsCowen (economist): +0.5 pp a year. Extra annual growth. “AI will boost economic growth rates by half a percentage point a year” Implied: 'half a percentage point' is written in wordsMisch et al. (economist): +0.2 pp a year. Extra annual productivity growth. “at around 1 percent cumulatively over five years” Implied: 1 percent over five years divided by 5Clark (Anthropic) (AI insider): +4 pp a year (range 3 to 5). Extra annual growth, bear to bull case. “my bear case on all of this is 3 percent, and my bull case is something like 5 percent”Filippucci et al. (economist): +0.85 pp a year (range 0.4 to 1.3). Extra annual labour productivity growth. “annual aggregate labour productivity growth due to AI range between 0.4-1.3 percentage points in countries with high AI exposure”Filippucci et al. (economist): +0.5 pp a year (range 0.3 to 0.7). Extra annual TFP growth in the US. “AI could raise annual total factor productivity (TFP) growth by around 0.3-0.7 percentage points in the United States over the next decade”Wynne & Derr (economist): +0.3 pp a year. Extra annual productivity growth (their 'more reasonable scenario'). “AI boosts annual productivity growth by 0.3 percentage points for the next decade”Wynne & DerrArnon (economist): +0.15 pp a year. Extra annual growth to 2035. “AI will increase productivity and GDP by 1.5% by 2035” Implied: 1.5% by 2035 divided by about 10 yearsArnon (economist): +0.04 pp a year. Permanent effect on annual productivity growth (upper bound). “with a permanent effect of less than 0.04 percentage points due to sectoral shifts”ArnonAnthropic (AI insider): +1.8 pp a year. Extra annual labour productivity growth from current models (extrapolation, not a prediction). “current-generation AI models could increase US labor productivity growth by 1.8% annually over the next decade”AnthropicIMF WEO (economist): +0.45 pp a year (range 0.1 to 0.8). Extra annual global growth in the medium term. “between 0.1 and 0.8 percentage points per year in the medium term”Jones & Tonetti (economist): +0.16 pp a year. Extra annual growth in GDP per person, implied (a model simulation, not the authors' forecast). “incomes are only 4% higher in 2050 than they would be if growth remained constant rather than accelerating” Implied: 4% higher income level in 2050, spread over about 25 years: 1.04^(1/25) - 1 = 0.16 pp a yearAmodei (Anthropic) (AI insider): +10 pp a year (range 5 to 15). Developed-world GDP growth he can see AI bringing (a total rate). “I can see a world where A.I. brings the developed world G.D.P. growth to something like 10, 15 percent. Five, 10, 15”CBO (economist): +0.1 pp a year. Extra annual TFP growth from generative AI. “annual TFP growth from 2026 to 2036 is 0.1 percentage point higher than it would have been without the additional contribution from generative AI diffusion”CBOKarger et al. (FRI survey) (economist): +0.5 pp a year. Extra annual GDP growth implied by the survey's median forecast over the baseline. “an annual GDP growth rate of 2.5%, which exceeds both the typical medium-run (2.0%) and long-run (1.7%) baseline forecasts” Implied: the median respondent's 2.5% a year minus the typical 2.0% medium-run baseline forecastLEAP experts (economist): +0.4 pp a year (range 0.4 to 1.7). Extra annual GDP growth implied by experts' forecasts over the slow-progress scenario (to rapid progress). “with median forecasts of 2.7%, 2.5%, and 2.5% annualized real GDP growth for 2025–2030, respectively—broadly in line with recent historical rates. Scenario assumptions make a substantial difference, however. Under Rapid Progress, the median expert expects 4.0% annualized growth to 2030 and 5.0% to 2050, while under Slow Progress those figures fall to 2.3% and 2.5%.” Implied: experts' unconditional 2.7% minus 2.3% under slow progress = 0.4; 4.0% under rapid progress minus 2.3% = 1.7Filippucci et al. (economist): +0.53 pp a year (range 0.1 to 0.95). Extra annual growth in per capita real income, across countries. “by 0.1–0.95 percentage points annually over the next decade in our central scenario”Brookings (economist): +3.63 pp a year. Extra annual GDP growth from AI. “A new BPEA paper projects that this buildout will total $10.3 trillion from 2025 to 2032, an average of 3.63% of U.S.”BrookingsAlrawashdeh et al. (economist): +0.83 pp a year. Extra annual GDP growth from AI. “The total effect is 0.829 at a significance level of 0.000, and the model accounts for 65.9% of the variance in economic growth.”

EconomistsAI insidersShaded: the middle half of each groupProductivity gain (including time saved)Open marker: AI labs’ own research

Effects reported as multiples

How many times faster or more output, as reported.

Growth in active users of an agentic coding tool (Codex), first half of 2026 (lower bound)Johnston et al. · 5×
0×5×

Shares

Shares of jobs, tasks, workers or firms, as reported. Definitions differ between studies.

S&P 500 firms with deep AI adoption, 2022Yu et al. · 5%
S&P 500 firms with AI deeply integrated into business processes, 2025Yu et al. · 11%
Share of workers or firms using AIJerbashian & Vilalta-Bufí · 16%
Manufacturers using AI, 2025New York Fed Liberty Street · 26%
Share of their own work US workers expect AI to do by 2030Anthropic · 28%
Service firms using AI, 2025New York Fed Liberty Street · 40%
Service firms using AI, 2026 (more than 60%)New York Fed Liberty Street · 60%
Share of their own work Anthropic staff expect AI to do by 2030Anthropic · 75%
0%75%

Open marker: AI labs’ own research

Other effects

Changes in employment, wages, adoption and other measures, as reported.

Change in a firm's share of AI workers per one-SD increase in firm ageChatjuthamard et al. · −5.2%
−5.5%0%

Read the source numbers

Each row retains its own definition, population and horizon. Rows are not a pooled estimate; a shared percentage unit does not make them comparable.

SourceWhat it measuresReported valueSource quotation
Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AIAI researchers' 50% year for machines outperforming humans at every task (2023 survey)

Region and horizon not recorded

2,047the chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task was estimated at 10% by 2027, and 50% by 2047
AI at Work: Use, Complementary Technologies, and Task ReallocationShare of workers or firms using AI

Spain

16%AI use is already economically meaningful but far from pervasive, with about 16% of workers reporting AI use.
The Projected Impact of Generative AI on Future Productivity GrowthPermanent effect on annual productivity growth (upper bound)

US

+0.04 pp a yearwith a permanent effect of less than 0.04 percentage points due to sectoral shifts
The AI workforce and firm maturity: old firms, new techChange in a firm's share of AI workers per one-SD increase in firm age

US

−5.2%a rise in firm age by one standard deviation reduces the share of AI workers by 5.2%
AI Adoption in S&P 500 FirmsS&P 500 firms with AI deeply integrated into business processes, 2025

US, S&P 500 · 2025

11%In 2025, 11% of S&P 500 enterprises had AI deeply integrated into their business processes
AI Adoption in S&P 500 FirmsS&P 500 firms with deep AI adoption, 2022

US, S&P 500 · 2022

5%AI adoption has more than quadrupled from 5% in 2022
The Shift to Agentic AI: Evidence from CodexGrowth in active users of an agentic coding tool (Codex), first half of 2026 (lower bound)

H1 2026

5×the number of active users has grown more than fivefold in the first half of 2026
The AI expectations gapShare of their own work Anthropic staff expect AI to do by 2030

US · by 2030

75%staff members expect AI to be able to do 75% of their current work by 2030
The AI expectations gapShare of their own work US workers expect AI to do by 2030

US · by 2030

28%compared to 28% for US workers overall
Machines of Loving Grace: How AI Could Transform the World for the BetterEarliest year “powerful AI” could arrive

Region and horizon not recorded

2,026I think it could come as early as 2026, though there are also ways it could take much longer.
When Will AI Exceed Human Performance? Evidence from AI ExpertsAI researchers' 50% year for AI outperforming humans at all tasks (2016 survey)

Region and horizon not recorded

2,061when the aggregate prediction put 50% probability at 2061, i.e. 45 years out
2022 Expert Survey on Progress in AIAI researchers' 50% year for high-level machine intelligence (2022 survey)

Region and horizon not recorded

2,059The aggregate forecast time to a 50% chance of HLMI was 37 years, i.e. 2059
Demis Hassabis on our AI future: 'It'll be 10 times bigger than the Industrial Revolution – and maybe 10 times faster'Year AGI could arrive (“possibly the lower end” of five to 10 years)

Region and horizon not recorded

2,030 (range 2,030 to 2,035)maybe in the next five to 10 years, possibly the lower end of that
AI 2027Modal (most likely) year for AGI at publication; medians were later

Region and horizon not recorded

2,0272027 was our modal (most likely) year at the time of publication
Businesses Are Using AI to Transform Work, Not Cut JobsService firms using AI, 2026 (more than 60%)

New York Fed region (US) · 2026

60%This year, we found that AI use among regional businesses has continued to rise sharply, with more than 60 percent of service firms and about half of manufacturers now using AI—a notable increase from 40 percent and 26 percent, respectively, reported in 2025.
Businesses Are Using AI to Transform Work, Not Cut JobsService firms using AI, 2025

New York Fed region (US) · 2025

40%This year, we found that AI use among regional businesses has continued to rise sharply, with more than 60 percent of service firms and about half of manufacturers now using AI—a notable increase from 40 percent and 26 percent, respectively, reported in 2025.
Businesses Are Using AI to Transform Work, Not Cut JobsManufacturers using AI, 2025

New York Fed region (US) · 2025

26%This year, we found that AI use among regional businesses has continued to rise sharply, with more than 60 percent of service firms and about half of manufacturers now using AI—a notable increase from 40 percent and 26 percent, respectively, reported in 2025.

Why the estimates differ